

# KTRW

# The journey to build a debuggable iPhone

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Brandon Azad

OBTS v3.0



[https://video-images.vice.com/\\_uncategorized/1551893361664-IMG\\_6918.jpeg?resize=1575:\\*](https://video-images.vice.com/_uncategorized/1551893361664-IMG_6918.jpeg?resize=1575:)



<https://pbs.twimg.com/media/D1bB7-pWsAAsTe-.jpg:large>

imac-noname:~ noname\$ astris  
astris v2.6.5 [Astris-827.50.7~274 (Electric tools)]

Probe address: KongSWD-  
Probe type: kong  
Probe firmware: 0.52  
Probe tckrate: 1950000

Listening on port 8000 for CPU0, CPU1  
Listening on port 8002 for IOP  
Listening on port 8003 for AE2  
Listening on port 8004 for ISP  
Detected HSP C0

KongSWD- - CPU0:Run CPU1:PowerOff IOP:Reset AE2:Reset ISP:PowerOff  
NO CPU > cpu cpu0

KongSWD- - CPU0:Run CPU1:PowerOff IOP:Reset AE2:Reset ISP:PowerOff

CPU0 > halt  
CPU0: ASTRIS\_ERR\_OK  
r0: 0x00000001 r1: 0xbffffc080 r2: 0x00000004 r3: 0x00000000  
r4: 0x00000001 r5: 0xbffffc080 r6: 0xbffffc084 r7: 0xbff60700  
r8: 0xbffffc080 r9: 0x00000000 r10: 0x00000001 r11: 0x00000400  
ip: 0x3f200020 sp: 0xbff606f4 lr: 0xbff0e709 pc: 0xbff0e768  
cpsr: 0x80000073 N-----FT Supervisor  
0xbff0e768: 0xbf28 it cs

KongSWD- - CPU0:Halt CPU1:PowerOff IOP:Reset AE2:Reset ISP:PowerOff

CPU0 > save ~/Desktop/iBoot 0xbff00000 0x50000  
.....  
327680 bytes received in 9.527 sec, 34395 bytes per second

KongSWD- - CPU0:Halt CPU1:PowerOff IOP:Reset AE2:Reset ISP:PowerOff

CPU0 > https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DyP1Q\_qX0AA838S?format=png&name=large

I do not use dev-fused  
devices

I do not use dev-fused  
devices

But they sure would make  
my security research easier...

# Goal: Build my own "home-brewed dev phone"

- Patch kernel memory (`__TEXT_EXEC`)
- Breakpoints, watchpoints
- Use with LLDB / IDA Pro
- Can update iOS version
- Only parts you can get at an Apple store



axi0mX

@axi0mX


Bootrom exploit philanthropist. Advanced persistent troublemaker. Thought follower. Bringing iOS jailbreaking back from the dead. #checkm8 #alloc8 #kloader64

⌚ checkra.in

🔗 [github.com/axi0mX](https://github.com/axi0mX)

🏢 Joined October 2015

🖼 36 Photos and videos



axi0mX   
@axi0mX

Follow



EPIC JAILBREAK: Introducing checkm8 (read "checkmate"), a permanent unpatchable bootrom exploit for hundreds of millions of iOS devices.

Most generations of iPhones and iPads are vulnerable: from iPhone 4S (A5 chip) to iPhone 8 and iPhone X (A11 chip).



axi0mX/ipwndfu

open-source jailbreaking tool for many iOS devices -

axi0mX/ipwndfu

[github.com](https://github.com/axi0mX/ipwndfu)

4:15 AM - 27 Sep 2019

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970



7.5K



16K



axi0mX @axi0mX · Sep 27

1/ The last iOS device with a public bootrom exploit until today was iPhone 4, which was released in 2010. This is possibly the biggest news in iOS jailbreak community in years. I am releasing my exploit for free for the benefit of iOS



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checkra1n  
@checkra1n



Pwn20wnd  
@Pwn20wnd



Siguza

# KTRR

---


# Goal: Build my own "home-brewed dev phone"

- **Patch kernel memory (\_\_TEXT\_EXEC)**
- Breakpoints, watchpoints
- Use with LLDB / IDA Pro
- Can update iOS version
- Only parts you can get at an Apple store

low addresses

high addresses


# kernelcache



low addresses

high addresses

# kernelcache




Read/write data

low addresses

high addresses

# kernelcache




Executable code

low addresses

high addresses


# kernelcache



low addresses

high addresses

Protected by KTRR




# KTRR (Kernel Text Readonly Region)


Strong form of W^X (write-xor-execute) protection


Apple A10 and later

All writes to memory in the KTRR region fail


All instruction fetches from outside the KTRR region fail








CPU cores





MMUs


L2 cache




Memory  
controller








CPU core  
**WRITE**  
0x839a6c000



MMUs



Memory  
controller

CPU core  
**WRITE**  
0x839a6c000

MMUs


L2 cache

Memory controller





DRAM


AMCC




CPU core  
**WRITE**  
0x839a6c000

OK






CPU core  
**WRITE**  
0x803280000



MMUs



Memory  
controller

CPU core  
**WRITE**  
0x803280000

MMUs


L2 cache

Memory controller


AMCC




DRAM



CPU core  
**WRITE**  
**0x803280000**




MMUs




Memory  
controller

CPU core

~~WRITER~~  
0x80320000




MMUs




Memory  
controller


AMCC



CPU core  
**EXEC**  
**0x839a6c000**




MMUs




Memory  
controller

CPU core  
**EXEC**  
**0x839a6c000**




MMUs




Memory  
controller

CPU core  
**EXEC**  
**0x839a6c000**




MMUs




Memory  
controller

CPU core  
0x839a5c000




MMUs

L2 cache




Memory  
controller

CPU cores





MMUs


L2 cache




Memory  
controller








CPU cores




L2 cache


AMCC



CPU cores




L2 cache




AMCC

CPU cores



L2 cache



AMCC

MMU registers lose state  
during core sleep

FFFFFFF0070E4000 LowResetVectorBase  
FFFFFFF0070E4000 MSR #0, c1, c0, #4  
FFFFFFF0070E4004 MSR #6, #0xF  
...  
FFFFFFF0070E4080 ADRL x17, \_rorgn\_begin  
FFFFFFF0070E4088 LDR x17, [x17]  
FFFFFFF0070E408C CBZ x17, Lskip\_ktrr  
FFFFFFF0070E4090 ADRL x19, \_rorgn\_end  
FFFFFFF0070E4098 LDR x19, [X19]  
FFFFFFF0070E409C CBZ x19, Lskip\_ktrr  
FFFFFFF0070E40A0 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_LOWER\_EL1, x17  
FFFFFFF0070E40A4 SUB x19, X19, #4, LSL#12  
FFFFFFF0070E40A8 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_UPPER\_EL1, x19  
FFFFFFF0070E40AC MOV x17, #1  
FFFFFFF0070E40B0 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_LOCK\_EL1, x17  
FFFFFFF0070E40B4 Lskip\_ktrr ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+8C↑j

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 LowResetVectorBase  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 MSR #0, c1, c0, #4  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4004 MSR #6, #0xF  
...  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4080 ADRL x17, \_rorgn\_begin  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4088 LDR x17, [x17]  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E408C CBZ x17, Lskip\_ktrr  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4090 ADRL x19, \_rorgn\_end  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4098 LDR x19, [X19]  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E409C CBZ x19, Lskip\_ktrr  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A0 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_LOWER\_EL1, x17  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A4 SUB x19, X19, #4, LSL#12  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A8 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_UPPER\_EL1, x19  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40AC MOV x17, #1  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B0 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_LOCK\_EL1, x17  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B4 Lskip\_ktrr ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+8C↑j

MMU KTRR  
bounds

FFFFFFF0070E4000 LowResetVectorBase

FFFFFFF0070E4000 MSR #0, c1, c0, #4

FFFFFFF0070E4004 MSR #6, #0xF

...

FFFFFFF0070E4080 ADRL x17, \_rorgn\_begin

FFFFFFF0070E4088 LDR x17, [x17]

FFFFFFF0070E408C CBZ x17, Lskip\_ktrr

FFFFFFF0070E4090 ADRL x19, \_rorgn\_end

FFFFFFF0070E4098 LDR x19, [X19]

FFFFFFF0070E409C CBZ x19, Lskip\_ktrr

FFFFFFF0070E40A0 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_LOWER\_EL1, x17

FFFFFFF0070E40A4 SUB X19, X19, #4, LSL#12


FFFFFFF0070E40A8 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_UPPER\_EL1, x19

FFFFFFF0070E40AC MOV X17, #1

FFFFFFF0070E40B0 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_LOCK\_EL1, X17

FFFFFFF0070E40B4 Lskip\_ktrr ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+8C↑j

MMU KTRR registers



# Breaking KTRR

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# iOS 10.1.1: The Yalu KTRR bypass

Luca Todesco found that Apple accidentally left an MSR  
TTBR1\_EL1 instruction executable


Use that instruction to set a new page table base

KTRR is still initialized (so no new kernel code), but readonly  
pages could now be made read/write

low addresses

high addresses

Protected by KTRR



low addresses

high addresses

Protected by KTRR



r w -

r w -

r - x

r w -

r - x

r w -

# iOS 11.1.2: Build your own iOS kernel debugger

Ian Beer found that self-hosted debugging could be enabled using ROP

Built an iOS kernel debugger with breakpoints for iOS 11.1.2 that works with LLDB

KTRR is still fully enabled, but existing instructions can be executed in arbitrary order

# Attempts to bypass KTRR

iBoot bug: no

TLB "corruption": no

L2 cache "corruption": no

# panic-base-2019-08-30-143759.i...

"kernel" : "Darwin Kernel Version 18.2.0: Mon Nov 12 20:32:02 PST 2018;  
root:xnu-4903.232.2~1/RELEASE\_ARM64\_T8015",  
"incident" : "479333C7-BAA2-4D77-8ABD-FD6C3B36B40C",  
"crashReporterKey" : "ce81d5ec16fcde03b706d6a939240745a65782a2",  
"date" : "2019-08-30 14:37:52.07 -0700",  
"panicString" : "Attempting to forcibly halt cpu 1\ncpu 1 failed to halt with  
error -5: halt not supported for this configuration\nDebugger  
synchronization timed out; waited 10000000 nanoseconds\npanic(cpu 0  
caller 0xffffffff00b5c96bc): \\"WDT timeout: CPU 1 failed to respond\\"@/\nBuildRoot/Library/Caches/com.apple.xbs/Sources/AppleARMPlatform/\nAppleARMPlatform-700.230.2/AppleARMWatchDogTimer.cpp:  
501\nDebugger message: panic\nMemory ID: 0xff\nOS version:  
16C101\nKernel version: Darwin Kernel Version 18.2.0: Mon Nov 12  
20:32:02 PST 2018; root:xnu-4903.232.2~1/\nRELEASE\_ARM64\_T8015\nKernelCache UUID:  
EE1D833E1AF3B367B764DA9719881315\nKernel UUID:  
94463A80-7B38-3176-8872-0B8E344C7138\nBoot version:  
iBoot-4513.230.10\nsecure boot?: YES\nPaniclog version: 11\nKernel slide:  
0x0000000000500000, Kernel offset: 0x00000000\_00400000, Event offset:



# panic-base-2019-08-30-143759.i...



"kernel" : "Darwin Kernel Version 18.2.0: Mon Nov 12 20:32:02 PST 2018;  
root:xnu-4903.232.2~1/RELEASE\_ARM64\_T8015",  
"incident" : "479333C7-BAA2-4D77-8ABD-FD6C3B36B40C",  
"crashReporterKey" : "ce81d5ec16fcde03b706d6a939240745a65782a2",  
"date" : "2019-08-30 14:37:52.07 -0700",  
"panicString" : "Attempting to forcibly halt cpu 1\ncpu 1 failed to halt with  
error -5: halt not supported for this configuration\nDebugger  
synchronization timed out; waited 10000000 nanoseconds\n**panic(cpu 0**  
**caller 0xffffffff00b5c96bc): \\"WDT timeout: CPU 1 failed to respond\\"@/**  
BuildRoot/Library/Caches/com.apple.xbs/Sources/AppleARMPlatform/  
AppleARMPlatform-700.230.2/AppleARMWatchDogTimer.cpp:  
501\nDebugger message: panic\nMemory ID: 0xff\nOS version:  
16C101\nKernel version: Darwin Kernel Version 18.2.0: Mon Nov 12  
20:32:02 PST 2018; root:xnu-4903.232.2~1/  
RELEASE\_ARM64\_T8015\nKernelCache UUID:  
EE1D833E1AF3B367B764DA9719881315\nKernel UUID:  
94463A80-7B38-3176-8872-0B8E344C7138\niBoot version:  
iBoot-4513.230.10\nsecure boot?: YES\nPaniclog version: 11\nKernel slide:  
0x0000000000500000\nKernel offset: 0x00000000\_00400000\nFaulting



# panic-base-2019-08-30-143759.i...



"kernel" : "Darwin Kernel Version 18.2.0: Mon Nov 12 20:32:02 PST 2018;  
root:xnu-4903.232.2~1/RELEASE\_ARM64\_T8015",  
"incident" : "479333C7-BAA2-4D77-8ABD-FD6C3B36B40C",  
"crashReporterKey" : "ce81d5ec16fcde03b706d6a939240745a65782a2",  
"date" : "2019-08-30 14:37:52.07 -0700",  
"panicString" : "**Attempting to forcibly halt cpu 1\ncpu 1 failed to halt with  
error -5: halt not supported for this configuration\nDebugger**  
synchronization timed out; waited 10000000 nanoseconds\npanic(cpu 0  
caller 0xffffffff00b5c96bc): \"WDT timeout: CPU 1 failed to respond\"@/\nBuildRoot/Library/Caches/com.apple.xbs/Sources/AppleARMPlatform/\nAppleARMPlatform-700.230.2/AppleARMWatchDogTimer.cpp:  
501\nDebugger message: panic\nMemory ID: 0xff\nOS version:  
16C101\nKernel version: Darwin Kernel Version 18.2.0: Mon Nov 12  
20:32:02 PST 2018; root:xnu-4903.232.2~1/\nRELEASE\_ARM64\_T8015\nKernelCache UUID:  
EE1D833E1AF3B367B764DA9719881315\nKernel UUID:  
94463A80-7B38-3176-8872-0B8E344C7138\nBoot version:  
iBoot-4513.230.10\nsecure boot?: YES\nPaniclog version: 11\nKernel slide:  
0x0000000000500000\nKernel offset: 0x00000000\_00400000\nFault type:

IDA - kernelcache.iPhone10,1.16G77.decompressed.i64 (kernelcache.iPhone10,1.16G77.decompressed) /Users/bazad/Developer/binaries/iOS/16G77/iPhone10,1/kernelcache.iPhone10,1.16G77.decompressed.i64

Library function Regular function Instruction Data Unexplored External symbol Lumina function

Functions window IDA View-A Pseudocode-A Strings window Structures Program Segmentation Local Types Hex View-1

Function name

sub\_FFFFFFFF0076274EC  
sub\_FFFFFFFF007627788  
sub\_FFFFFFFF00762786C  
sub\_FFFFFFFF007627964  
sub\_FFFFFFFF007627A30  
sub\_FFFFFFFF007627B0C  
sub\_FFFFFFFF007627CFC  
sub\_FFFFFFFF00762C000  
sub\_FFFFFFFF00762C064  
sub\_FFFFFFFF00762C088  
sub\_FFFFFFFF00762C11C  
sub\_FFFFFFFF00762C128  
sub\_FFFFFFFF00762C12C  
sub\_FFFFFFFF00762C180  
sub\_FFFFFFFF00762C298  
sub\_FFFFFFFF00762CA54  
sub\_FFFFFFFF00762CD54  
sub\_FFFFFFFF00762CE28  
sub\_FFFFFFFF00762D020  
sub\_FFFFFFFF00762D3A4  
sub\_FFFFFFFF00762D55C  
\_KLD\_InitFunc\_0  
\_KLD\_TermFunc\_0

Line 80633 of 80634

0000E0000 FFFFFFFF0070E4000: LowResetVectorBase (Synchronized with Hex View-1)

Output window

```
FFFFFFFFFF0070B9478: using guessed type __int64 *kernel_pmap;
FFFFFFFFFF0070B96E8: using guessed type __int64 gPhysBase;
FFFFFFFFFF0070B9700: using guessed type __int64 qword_FFFFFFFF0070B9700;
FFFFFFFFFF007663080: using guessed type __int64 kernel_map;
FFFFFFFFFF007663088: using guessed type __int64 page_size;
```

Python

AU: idle Down Disk: 51GB

Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4000  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4000 ; Attributes: noreturn  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4000  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4000 LowResetVectorBase  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4000 MSR #0, c1, c0, #4  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4004 MSR #6, #0xF  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4008 MOVK X0, #0x4455, LSL#48  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E400C MOVK X0, #0x4455, LSL#32  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4010 MOVK X0, #0x6466, LSL#16  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4014 MOVK X0, #0x6677  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4018 BL sub\_FFFFFFFF0070E85A0  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E401C ADRP X4, #\_aprr\_jit@PAGE  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4020 LDRB W5, [X4, #\_aprr\_jit@PAGEOFF]  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4024 CMP W5, #0  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4028 B.NE loc\_FFFFFFFF0070E4044  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E402C MOVK X0, #0x4545, LSL#48  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4030 MOVK X0, #0x101, LSL#32  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4034 MOVK X0, #0x6767, LSL#16  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4038 MOVK X0, #0x101  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E403C BL sub\_FFFFFFFF0070E8578  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4040 B loc\_FFFFFFFF0070E4058  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4044 ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+28+j  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4044 MOVK X0, #0x4545, LSL#48  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4048 MOVK X0, #0x101, LSL#32  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E404C MOVK X0, #0x6567, LSL#16  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4050 MOVK X0, #0x101  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4054 BL sub\_FFFFFFFF0070E8578  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4058 loc\_FFFFFFFF0070E4058 ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+40+j  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4058 MOVK X0, #0, LSL#48  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E405C MOVK X0, #0, LSL#32  
Text EXEC. text: FFFFFFFF0070E4060 MOVK X0, #0, LSL#16

bazad@bazad-macbookpro: ~/Developer/source/xnu — zsh

Last login: Mon Dec 16 15:05:24 on ttys025

bazad@bazad-macbookpro ~ % cd ~/Developer/source/xnu

bazad@bazad-macbookpro ~/Developer/source/xnu (git)-[master] % grep -RF "Attempting to fo  
rcibly halt" .

./osfmk/arm/model\_dep.c: paniclog\_append\_noflush("Attempti  
ng to forcibly halt cpu %d\n", cpu);

bazad@bazad-macbookpro ~/Developer/source/xnu (git)-[master] % █

Line E  
Out  
FFFF  
FFFFFFFFF0070B9700: using guessed type \_\_int64 qword\_FFFFFFF0070B9700;  
FFFFF007663080: using guessed type \_\_int64 kernel\_map;  
FFFFF007663088: using guessed type \_\_int64 page\_size;

Python

```
101 ml_dbgwrap_halt_cpu(int cpu_index, uint64_t timeout_ns)
102 {
103     cpu_data_t *cdp = cpu_datap(cpu_index);
104     if ((cdp == NULL) || (cdp->coresight_base[CORESIGHT_UTT] == 0))
105         return DBGWRAP_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
106
107     /* Only one cpu is allowed to initiate the halt sequence, to prevent cpus from cr
108        oss-halting
109        * each other. The first cpu to request a halt may then halt any and all other c
110        pus besides itself. */
111     int curcpu = cpu_number();
112     if (cpu_index == curcpu)
113         return DBGWRAP_ERR_SELF_HALTED;
```

1 osfmk/arm64/dbgwrap.c [c,utf-8,unix]

0 112,0-1

36%

FFFFFFFFFF0070B97000: using guessed type \_\_int64 qword\_FFFFFFFF0070B97000;
FFFFFFFFFF007663080: using guessed type \_\_int64 kernel\_map;
FFFFFFFFFF007663088: using guessed type \_\_int64 page\_size;

Python

```
114     (halt_from_cpu != (uint32_t)curcpu))
115     return DBGWRAP_ERR_INPROGRESS;
116
117     volatile dbgwrap_reg_t *dbgWrapReg = (volatile dbgwrap_reg_t *) (cdp->coresight_base[CORESIGHT_UTT] + DBGWRAP_REG_OFFSET);
118
119     if (ml_dbgwrap_cpu_is_halted(cpu_index))
120         return DBGWRAP_WARN_ALREADY_HALTED;
121
122     /* Clear all other writable bits besides dbgHalt; none of the power-down or reset
123      bits must be set. */
124     *dbgWrapReg = DBGWRAP_DBGHALT;
125
126     if (timeout_ns != 0) {
```

1 osfmk/arm64/dbgwrap.c [c,utf-8,unix]

9

125,1-4

41%

FFFFFFFFFF0070B97000: using guessed type \_\_int64 qword\_FFFFFFFF0070B97000;
FFFFFFFFFF007663080: using guessed type \_\_int64 kernel\_map;
FFFFFFFFFF007663088: using guessed type \_\_int64 page\_size;

Python

```
114     (halt_from_cpu != (uint32_t)curcpu))
115     return DBGWRAP_ERR_INPROGRESS;
116
117     volatile dbgwrap_reg_t *dbgWrapReg = (volatile dbgwrap_reg_t *) (cdp->coresight_base[CORESIGHT_UTT] + DBGWRAP_REG_OFFSET);
118
119     if (ml_dbgwrap_cpu_is_halted(cpu_index))
120         return DBGWRAP_WARN_ALREADY_HALTED;
121
122     /* Clear all other writable bits besides dbgHalt; none of the power-down or reset
123    bits must be set. */
124
125     if (timeout_ns != 0) {
126
127         if (timeout_ns > 0) {
128             /* Set the timeout value */
129             *dbgWrapReg = (DBGWRAP_DBGHALT | (timeout_ns << 16));
130
131             /* Wait for the halt to complete */
132             while ((*dbgWrapReg & DBGWRAP_DBGHALT) != DBGWRAP_DBGHALT) {
133                 /* Do nothing */
134             }
135
136             /* Clear the timeout value */
137             *dbgWrapReg = DBGWRAP_DBGHALT;
138
139             /* Return success */
140             return DBGWRAP_SUCCESS;
141
142         } else {
143             /* Set the timeout value to 0 */
144             *dbgWrapReg = (DBGWRAP_DBGHALT | (0 << 16));
145
146             /* Wait for the halt to complete */
147             while ((*dbgWrapReg & DBGWRAP_DBGHALT) != DBGWRAP_DBGHALT) {
148                 /* Do nothing */
149             }
150
151             /* Clear the timeout value */
152             *dbgWrapReg = DBGWRAP_DBGHALT;
153
154             /* Return success */
155             return DBGWRAP_SUCCESS;
156
157         }
158
159     } else {
160
161         /* Set the timeout value to 0 */
162         *dbgWrapReg = (DBGWRAP_DBGHALT | (0 << 16));
163
164         /* Wait for the halt to complete */
165         while ((*dbgWrapReg & DBGWRAP_DBGHALT) != DBGWRAP_DBGHALT) {
166             /* Do nothing */
167         }
168
169         /* Clear the timeout value */
170         *dbgWrapReg = DBGWRAP_DBGHALT;
171
172         /* Return success */
173         return DBGWRAP_SUCCESS;
174
175     }
176
177 }
```

MMIO  
register

1 osfmk/arm64/dbgwrap.c [c,utf-8,unix]

9

125,1-4

41%

```
114     (halt_from_cpu != (uint32_t)curcpu))
115     return DBGWRAP_ERR_INPROGRESS;
116
117     volatile dbgwrap_reg_t *dbgWrapReg = (volatile dbgwrap_reg_t *) (cdp->coresight_base[CORESIGHT_UTT] + DBGWRAP_REG_OFFSET);
118
119     if (ml_dbgwrap_cpu_is_halted(cpu_index)) CoreSight?
120         return DBGWRAP_WARN_ALREADY_HALTED;
121
122     /* Clear all other writable bits besides dbgHalt; none of the power-down or reset
123     bits must be set. */
124     *dbgWrapReg = DBGWRAP_DBGHALT;
125
126     if (timeout_ns != 0) {
```

1 osfmk/arm64/dbgwrap.c [c,utf-8,unix]

9

125,1-4

41%

FFFFFFFFFF0070B97000: using guessed type \_\_int64 qword\_FFFFFFFF0070B97000;
FFFFFFFFFF007663080: using guessed type \_\_int64 kernel\_map;
FFFFFFFFFF007663088: using guessed type \_\_int64 page\_size;

```
dbgwrap_status_t
ml_dbgwrap_halt_cpu_with_state(int cpu_index,
        uint64_t timeout_ns, dbgwrap_thread_state_t *state) {
cpu_data_t *cdp = cpu_datap(cpu_index);
...
/* Ensure memory-mapped coresight registers can be written */
*((volatile uint32_t *) (cdp->coresight_base[CORESIGHT_ED]
+ ARM_DEBUG_OFFSET_DBGLAR)) = ARM_DBG_LOCK_ACCESS_KEY;
...
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ...; ++i) {
    instr = (0xD51U << 20) | ... | i; // msr DBGDTR0, x<i>
    ml_dbgwrap_stuff_instr(cdp, instr, ...);
    state->x[i] = ml_dbgwrap_read_dtr(cdp, ...);
}
...
return status;
```

```
dbgwrap_status_t
ml_dbgwrap_halt_cpu_with_state(int cpu_index,
                                uint64_t timeout_ns, dbgwrap_thread_state_t *state) {
    cpu_data_t *cdp = cpu_datap(cpu_index);
...
    /* Ensure memory-mapped coresight registers can be written */
    *((volatile uint32_t *) (cdp->coresight_base[CORESIGHT_ED]
        + ARM_DEBUG_OFFSET_DBGLAR)) = ARM_DBG_LOCK_ACCESS_KEY;
...
    for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ...; ++i) {
        instr = (0xD51U << 20) | ... | i; // msr DBGDTR0, x<i>
        ml_dbgwrap_stuff_instr(cdp, instr, ...);
        state->x[i] = ml_dbgwrap_read_dtr(cdp, ...);
    }
...
    return status;
```

```
dbgwrap_status_t
ml_dbgwrap_halt_cpu_with_state(int cpu_index,
                                uint64_t timeout_ns, dbgwrap_thread_state_t *state) {
    cpu_data_t *cdp = cpu_datap(cpu_index);
...
/* Ensure memory-mapped coresight registers can be written */
*((volatile uint32_t *) (cdp->coresight_base[CORESIGHT_ED]
+ ARM_DEBUG_OFFSET_DBGLAR)) = ARM_DBG_LOCK_ACCESS_KEY;
...
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ...; ++i) {
    instr = (0xD51U << 20) | ... | i; // msr DBGDTR0, x<i>
    ml_dbgwrap_stuff_instr(cdp, instr, ...);
    state->x[i] = ml_dbgwrap_read_dtr(cdp, ...);
}
...
return status;
```

```
dbgwrap.c:111 ml_dbgwrap_stuff_instr()
cpuid(0x1, &eax);
...
/* ml_dbgwrap_stuff_instr() is executing
 * dynamically-generated instructions!
 */
...  
*/
```

```
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ...; ++i) {
    instr = (0xD51U << 20) | ... | i; // msr DBGDTR0, x<i>
    ml_dbgwrap_stuff_instr(cdp, instr, ...);
    state->x[i] = ml_dbgwrap_read_dtr(cdp, ...);
}

...
return status;
```

voucher\_swap > bazad-iphone8

Finished running voucher\_swap on bazad-iphone8

27

voucher\_swap > app > AppDelegate.m -applicationDidFinishLaunchingWithOptions:

```
896         // Set EDLAR to unlock the CoreSight registers.
897         uint32_t edlsr = kernel_call_7(ldr_w0_x0_ret, 1, (ed_mmio + 0xFB4));
898         INFO(" edlsr = %x", edlsr);
899         kernel_call_7(str_w0_x1_ret, 2, 0xc5acce55, (ed_mmio + 0xFB0));
900         edlsr = kernel_call_7(ldr_w0_x0_ret, 1, (ed_mmio + 0xFB4));
901         INFO(" edlsr = %x", edlsr);
902     }
903
904     // Try to call ml_dbgwrap_halt_cpu_with_state.
905     uint64_t dbgwrap_thread_state = kernel_vm_allocate(0x4000);
906     uint32_t halt_status = kernel_call_7(ml_dbgwrap_halt_cpu_with_state, 3, 2, 10000000,
907                                         dbgwrap_thread_state);
908     INFO("halt_status = %x", halt_status);
909     arm_thread_state64_t state = {};
910     kernel_read(dbgwrap_thread_state, &state, sizeof(state));
911     for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(state._x) / sizeof(state._x[0]); i++) {
912         printf(" x[%2d] = %016llx\n", i, state._x[i]);
913     }
914     printf(" fp = %016llx\n", state._fp);
915     printf(" lr = %016llx\n", state._lr);
916     printf(" sp = %016llx\n", state._sp);
917     printf(" pc = %016llx\n", state._pc);
918     printf(" cpsr = %08x\n", state._cpsr);
919     sleep(1);
```

No Debug Session



```
x[23] = 0000000000000000
x[24] = 0000000000000000
x[25] = 0000000000000000
x[26] = 0000000000000000
x[27] = 0000000000000000
x[28] = 0000000000000000
fp = 0000000000000000
lr = 00000008942e466c
sp = 0000000000000000
pc = 00000008942e4120
cpsr = 600003c5
```



voucher\_swap > bazad-iphone8

Finished running voucher\_swap on bazad-iphone8

27

voucher\_swap > app > AppDelegate.m -application:didFinishLaunchingWithOptions:

```
896 // Set EDLAR to unlock the CoreSight registers.  
897     uint32_t edlsr = kernel_call_7(ldr_w0_x0_ret, 1, (ed_mmio + 0xFB4));  
  
x[23] = 0000000000000000  
x[24] = 0000000000000000  
x[25] = 0000000000000000  
x[26] = 0000000000000000  
x[27] = 0000000000000000  
x[28] = 0000000000000000  
fp = 0000000000000000  
lr = 00000008042e406c  
sp = 0000000000000000  
pc = 00000008042e4120  
cpsr = 600003c5  
  
acce55, (ed_mmio + 0xFB0));  
1, (ed_mmio + 0xFB4));  
  
e.  
locate(0x4000);  
rap_halt_cpu_with_state, 3, 2, 10000000,  
  
zeof(state));  
of(state._x[0]); i++) {  
state._x[i]);  
  
All Output
```

```
x[23] = 0000000000000000  
x[27] = 0000000000000000  
x[28] = 0000000000000000  
fp = 0000000000000000  
lr = 00000008042e406c  
sp = 0000000000000000  
pc = 00000008042e4120  
cpsr = 600003c5
```

All Output



Auto



All Output



voucher\_swap > bazad-iphone8

Finished running voucher\_swap on bazad-iphone8

896 // Set EDLAR to unlock the CoreSight registers.

897       uint32\_t edlsr = kernel\_call 7(ldr w0\_x0\_ret, 1, (ed\_mmio + 0xFB4));

x[23] = 0000000000000000  
x[24] = 0000000000000000  
x[25] = 0000000000000000  
x[26] = 0000000000000000  
x[27] = 0000000000000000  
x[28] = 0000000000000000  
fp = 0000000000000000  
lr = 00000008042e406c  
sp = 0000000000000000  
pc = 00000008042e4120  
cpsr = 600003c5

No Debug Sess

All Output

Kernel mode

acce55, (ed\_mmio + 0xFB0));  
1, (ed\_mmio + 0xFB4));  
e.  
locate(0x4000);  
rap\_halt\_cpu\_with\_state, 3, 2, 10000000,  
  
zeof(state));  
of(state.\_x[0]); i++) {  
state.\_x[i]);

voucher\_swap > bazad-iphone8

Finished running voucher\_swap on bazad-iphone8

896 // Set EDLAR to unlock the CoreSight registers.

897 uint32\_t edlsr = kernel\_call 7(ldr w0\_x0\_ret, 1, (ed\_mmio + 0xFB4));

x[23] = 0000000000000000  
x[24] = 0000000000000000  
x[25] = 0000000000000000  
x[26] = 0000000000000000  
x[27] = 0000000000000000  
x[28] = 0000000000000000  
fp = 0000000000000000  
lr = 00000008042e406c  
sp = 0000000000000000  
pc = 00000008042e4120  
cpsr = 600003c5

No Debug Sess

All Output

acce55, (ed\_mmio + 0xFB0));  
1, (ed\_mmio + 0xFB4));  
e.  
locate(0x4000);  
rap\_halt\_cpu\_with\_state, 3, 2, 10000000,  
  
zeof(state));  
of(state.\_x[0]); i++) {  
state.\_x[i]);

Reset vector!

x[28] = 0000000000000000  
x[27] = 0000000000000000  
x[28] = 0000000000000000  
fp = 0000000000000000  
lr = 00000008042e406c  
sp = 0000000000000000  
pc = 00000008042e4120  
cpsr = 600003c5

All Output

We've halted execution in  
the reset vector, before the  
MMU has been turned on!

We've halted execution in  
the reset vector, before the  
MMU has been turned on!

How do we use this?

What exactly is this  
CoreSight thing  
anyway?

## H8.4 Memory-mapped accesses to the external debug interface

Support for memory-mapped access to the external debug interface is OPTIONAL. When memory-mapped access to the external debug interface is supported, the external debug interface is accessed as a little-endian memory-mapped peripheral.

If the external debug interface is CoreSight compliant, then an OPTIONAL Software Lock can be implemented for memory-mapped accesses to each component.

The Software Lock is OPTIONAL and deprecated. If [ARMv8.4-Debug](#) is implemented, the Software Lock is not implemented. If it is not implemented, the behavior is as if it is unlocked. The Software Locks are controlled by [EDLSR](#) and [EDLAR](#), [PMLSR](#) and [PMLAR](#), and [CTILSR](#) and [CTILAR](#). See [Management registers and CoreSight compliance](#) on page K2-7237.

With the exception of these registers and the effect of the Software Lock, the behavior of the memory-mapped accesses is the same as for other accesses to the external debug interface.

---

### Note

---

The recommended memory-mapped accesses to the external debug interface are not compatible with the memory-mapped interface defined in ARMv7. In particular:

- The memory map is different.
  - Memory-mapped accesses do not behave differently to Debug Access Port accesses when [OSLSR.OSLK](#) = 1, meaning that the OS Lock is locked.
- 

The following sections give more information about these memory-mapped accesses:

# Nailgun Attack

*Break the privilege isolation in ARM devices*

## Overview

Processors nowadays are consistently equipped with debugging features to facilitate the program debugging and analysis. Specifically, the ARM debugging architecture involves a series of CoreSight components and debug registers to aid the system debugging, but the security of the debugging features is under-examined since it normally requires physical access to use these features in the traditional debugging model.

The idea of Nailgun Attack is to misuse the debugging architecture with the inter-processor debugging model. In the inter-processor debugging model, a processor

# CoreSight External Debug Interface

On-chip debug architecture

Per-CPU debug registers accessible via MMIO

Extensively documented in the ARMv8 manual

Can set breakpoints/watchpoints, execute instructions, etc

The memory-mapped version of the debug registers used by Ian Beer in "Build your own iOS kernel debugger"

Use External Debug  
to single-step  
`LowResetVectorBase`  
and skip KTRR lockdown

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 LowResetVectorBase  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000      MSR      #0, c1, c0, #4  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4004      MSR      #6, #0xF  
...  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4080      ADRL      x17, \_rorgn\_begin  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4088      LDR      x17, [x17]  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E408C      CBZ      x17, Lskip\_ktrr  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4090      ADRL      x19, \_rorgn\_end  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E4098      LDR      x19, [x19]  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E409C      CBZ      x19, Lskip\_ktrr  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A0      MSR      ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_LOWER\_EL1, x17  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A4      SUB      x19, x19, #4, LSL#12  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A8      MSR      ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_UPPER\_EL1, x19  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40AC      MOV      x17, #1  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B0      MSR      ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_LOCK\_EL1, x17  
FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B4      Lskip\_ktrr ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+8C↑j

# Challenges

We can halt a CPU core, and we can execute instructions on it to modify state, but how do we resume execution after making our modifications?

We are using one CPU core to hijack another as it executes the reset vector, so how do we handle subsequent core resets?



FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 LowResetVectorBase

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 MSR #0, c1, c0, #4

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4004 MSR #6, #0xF

...

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4080 ADRL x17, \_rorgn\_begin

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4088 LDR x17, [x17]

FFFFFFFFFF0070E408C CBZ x17, Lskip\_ktrr

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4090 ADRL x19, \_rorgn\_end

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4098 LDR x19, [x19]

FFFFFFFFFF0070E409C CBZ x19, Lskip\_ktrr

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A0 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_LOWER\_EL1, x17

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A4 SUB x19, x19, #4, LSL#12

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A8 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_UPPER\_EL1, x19

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40AC MOV x17, #1

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B0 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_LOCK\_EL1, x17

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B4 Lskip\_ktrr ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+8C↑j

Take this branch

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 LowResetVectorBase

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 MSR #0, c1, c0, #4

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4004 MSR #6, #0xF

...

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4080 ADRL x17, \_rorgn\_begin

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4088 LDR x17, [x17]

FFFFFFFFFF0070E408C CBZ x17, Lskip\_ktrr

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4090 ADRL x19, \_rorgn\_end

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4098 LDR x19, [x19]

FFFFFFFFFF0070E409C CBZ x19, Lskip\_ktrr

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A0 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_LOWER\_EL1, x17

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A4 SUB x19, x19, #4, LSL#12

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A8 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_UPPER\_EL1, x19

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40AC MOV x17, #1

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B0 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_LOCK\_EL1, x17

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B4 Lskip\_ktrr ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+8C↑j

Take this  
branch

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 LowResetVectorBase

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4000 MSR #0, c1, c0, #4

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4004 MSR #6, #0xF

...

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4080 ADRL x17, \_rorgn\_begin

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4088 LDR x17, [x17]

FFFFFFFFFF0070E408C CBZ x17, Lskip\_ktrr

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4090 ADRL x19, \_rorgn\_end

FFFFFFFFFF0070E4098 LDR x19, [x19]

FFFFFFFFFF0070E409C CBZ x19, Lskip\_ktrr

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A0 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_Lo\_EL1, x17

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A4 SUB X19, X17, LSL#1

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40A8 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_Upper\_EL1, X19


FFFFFFFFFF0070E40AC MOV X17, #1

FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B0 MSR ARM64\_REG\_KTRR\_Lo\_EL1, X17


FFFFFFFFFF0070E40B4 Lskip\_ktrr ; CODE XREF: LowResetVectorBase+8C↑j

Take this branch

CPU cores




L2 cache




AMCC

CPU cores




MMUs

L2 cache



AMCC



Kernel shellcode  
mode activated!

The diagram illustrates a memory hierarchy. At the bottom, there are two sets of memory blocks: one set is light red and the other is light blue. Each set contains two purple rectangular components. Arrows point from these components to the text "MMUs" and "L2" respectively. An arrow also points from the "L2" component to a green hexagonal block labeled "AMCC". The "AMCC" block contains two red trapezoidal components. Arrows point from the "AMCC" block back up to the "L2" and the red memory blocks. A large white box with a black border is positioned above the memory blocks. It contains the text "Kernel shellcode mode activated!" in black. To the right of this box is a green vertical rectangle with a white "M" on it.

MMUs

AMCC


# Building KTRW

---


# Steps to building a kernel debugger

- Remapping the kernel
- Loading a kernel extension
- Interrupt handling
- Communication channel
- GDB stub

CPU cores




L2 cache




AMCC

MMUs

CPU cores




MMUs



AMCC

RoRgn pages  
are still readonly





# Remapping the kernel


We need to modify page table permissions to make the kext's memory executable

Root page tables are in the KTRR region (still readonly)

Solution: Remap the kernel onto fresh, writable pages and set `TTBR1_EL1` to point to the new page tables







# Loading kernel extensions

Allocate kernel memory for the kext

Copy in the kext binary

Dynamically link against kernel symbols

Modify page tables to make it executable

Call the `kext_start()` function

# KTRW: High-level design

One (monitor) core reserved for KTRW

Other (debugged) cores run XNU normally

Breakpoints/watchpoints cause the debugged core to halt and enter Debug state

Monitor core polls for entry to Debug state and notifies LLDB over some communication channel

Need some channel for  
LLDB to communicate with  
the KTRW kext

# Communication channels

Serial	USB	WiFi

# Communication channels

Serial	USB	WiFi
Easy	Fast	An option

# Communication channels

Serial	USB	WiFi
Easy	Fast	An option
Requires <i>special</i> hardware	Write a custom USB stack	Write a custom WiFi driver

# Communication channels

Serial	USB	WiFi
Easy	Fast	An option
Requires <i>special</i> hardware	Write a custom USB stack	Write a custom WiFi driver



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DesignWare Hi-Speed USB 2.0 On-the-Go Controller

## DesignWare Hi-Speed USB 2.0 On-the-Go Controller

The DesignWare® Hi-Speed USB 2.0 On-The-Go (HS OTG) Controller provides designers with high-quality USB IP for the most demanding USB 2.0 peripherals. The controller performs as a standard Hi-Speed Dual-Role Device (DRD), operating as either a USB 2.0 Hi-Speed peripheral, or Hi-Speed USB 2.0 Host. Based on Synopsys' success in building and deploying Hi-Speed USB 2.0 Host, Device and PHY designs, the DesignWare USB 2.0 HS OTG Controller incorporates Synopsys expertise in Reuse Methodology, Constrained Random Verification, and USB PHY interoperability to deliver flexible, quality IP in Verilog source. The controller is optimized for area- and power-sensitive markets such as Internet of Things (IoT).

 [DesignWare IP Prototyping Kit for USB 2.0 HS OTG](#)

 [DesignWare IP Prototyping Kits](#)



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## SolvNetPlus

### Sign In

Username



Please enter a username

Password



Sign In

Need help signing in?

REGISTER - CREATE ACCOUNT

FORGOT PASSWORD



## raspberrypi / linux

Watch

721

Star

6.3k

Fork

3.1k

Code

Issues 243

Pull requests 28

Projects 0

Wiki

Security

Insights

Tree: c0e4ca1745 ▾

linux / drivers / usb / host / dwc\_otg / dwc\_otg\_regs.h

Find file Copy path



popcornmix Add dwc\_otg driver

132ff67 on May 13

1 contributor

2550 lines (2376 sloc) | 70.3 KB

Raw

Blame

History



```
1173 * This union represents the bit fields in the Device Control
1174 * Register. Read the register into the <i>d32</i> member then
1175 * set/clear the bits using the <i>b</i>it elements.
1176 */
1177 typedef union dctl_data {
1178     /** raw register data */
1179     uint32_t d32;
1180     /** register bits */
1181     struct {
1182         /** Remote Wakeup */
1183         unsigned rmtwkupsig:1;
1184         /** Soft Disconnect */
1185         unsigned sftdiscon:1;
1186         /** Global Non-Periodic IN NAK Status */
1187         unsigned gnpinnaksts:1;
1188         /** Global OUT NAK Status */
1189         unsigned goutnaksts:1;
```

Library function Regular function Instruction Data Unexplored External symbol Lumina function

Functions window    IDA Vie...    Pseudocode    Structur...    Local Ty...    Hex Vie...    Strings win...    Program Segmentat...

Function name

```

50     out_daint = (unsigned int)daint >> 16;
51     in_daint = (unsigned __int16)daint;
52     for ( diepint_reg_off = 0x908LL; ; diepint_reg_off += 0x20LL )
53     {
54         if ( !(in_daint | out_daint) || ep_num > 5 )
55             goto DONE;
56         if ( in_daint & 1 )
57         {
58             diepint = *(_DWORD *)diepint_reg_off | 0x230100000LL;// DIEPINT
59             syn_otg.endpoints[ep_idx_in].depint |= diepint;
60             *(_DWORD *)diepint_reg_off | 0x230100000LL) = diepint;
61             if ( syn_otg.endpoints[ep_idx_in].is_active )
62             {
63                 if ( diepint & 1 ) // xfercompl -- when is this signalled? When all packets have been a
64                 // Well I'm dealing with control transfers, so it's on each transact:
65             {
66                 endpoint_off = (int *)__shifted(syn_otg_endpoint,-0x10))(&syn_otg.pending_setup_pkt
67                                         + ep_idx_in * 80);
68                 cur_ioreq = syn_otg.endpoints[ep_idx_in].current_io_req;
69                 if ( cur_ioreq )
70                 {
71                     cur_ioreq->transferred_size += ADJ(endpoint_off)[1].current_transfer_size;
72                     *(_QWORD *)&ADJ(endpoint_off)[1].current_transfer_size = 0LL;
73                     cur_ioreq = ADJ(endpoint_off)[1].current_io_req;
74                     if ( cur_ioreq->transferred_size >= cur_ioreq->size )
75                     {
76                         cur_ioreq->state = 0;
77                         cur_ioreq = ADJ(endpoint_off)[1].current_io_req;
78                         endpoint_off = (int *)__shifted(syn_otg_endpoint,-0x10))(&syn_otg.pending_setup_pkt
79 
```

Line 140 of 583

UNKNOWN syn\_otg\_int\_handler:53 (1000053A4)

## Output window

In general, the decompiler checks the segment permissions, class, and name to determine if it is read-only.

-> OK

1000052FC: restored microcode from idb

Python

A Express

USB 3.1 Bus

▼ USB 3.1 Bus

KTRW

**KTRW:**


Product ID:	0x1337
Vendor ID:	0x05ac (Apple Inc.)
Version:	0.00
Serial Number:	Google Project Zero
Speed:	Up to 480 Mb/s
Manufacturer:	Brandon Azad
Location ID:	0x14200000 / 3
Current Available (mA):	500
Current Required (mA):	500
Extra Operating Current (mA):	0

```
.. (up a dir)
</Developer/exploits/ktrw/
▼ ktrw_gdb_stub/
  ▼ source/
    ▼ gdb_stub/
      gdb_cpu.c
      gdb_cpu.h
      gdb_internal.c
      gdb_internal.h
      gdb_packets.c
      gdb_packets.h
      gdb_platform.c
      gdb_platform.h
      gdb_rsp.c
      gdb_rsp.h
      gdb_state.h
      gdb_stub.c
      gdb_stub.h
    ▶ third_party/

```

```
799
800 // ---- m packet -----
801
802 static sends_a_packet
803 gdb_pkt__m(struct packet *pkt) {
804     uint64_t address;
805     uint64_t length;
806     bool ok = pkt_read_hex_u64(pkt, &address)
807         && pkt_read_match(pkt, ",")
808         && pkt_read_hex_u64(pkt, &length)
809         && pkt_empty(pkt);
810     if (!ok) {
811         return send_error_bad_packet("m");
812     }
813     uint8_t data[GDB_RSP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE / 2];
814     if (length > sizeof(data)) {
815         return send_error_invalid_length("m");
816     }
817     size_t read = gdb_stub_read_memory(gdb.current_cpu, ad
818     if (read == 0 && length > 0) {
```

```
1 ktrw_gdb_stub/source/gdb_stub/gdb_packets.c [c,utf-8,unix] 0>
```



# oob\_timestamp

---

# DEMO

<https://github.com/googleprojectzero/ktrw>

<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/10/ktrw-journey-to-build-debuggable-iphone.html>