Code signing flaw in macOS

> whoami

Thomas Reed Director of Mac & Mobile @ Malwarebytes

@thomasareed



Old-school malware

> Viruses!?

> "A virus operates by inserting or attaching itself to a legitimate program or document [...] in order to execute its code."¹




- > None currently active on Macs
- > Cases where malware was added to an existing app were done manually, not automatically

1 - https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-malware-what-is-a-computer-virus.html


Mac viruses?

- >Are viruses impossible on modern macOS, due to code signing?
- > Unfortunately, no.
- > Why not? Let's look at how code signing works.



Code signing on Mac

- > Most apps code signed today
- >Unsigned apps not allowed by default
- >macOS verifies code signature before running downloaded apps



Code signing on Mac

> So, code signed apps are safe, right?

WRONG !

Code signing on Mac

- > Apps are "quarantined" when downloaded
- > Gatekeeper only checks code signature for quarantined apps
- >After opening, quarantine flag is removed
- > Code signature is never checked again!





Time for mischief!

- > Malware almost always wants persistence
- > Malware almost always wants to be hidden
- >Achieve both by infecting apps that are no longer quarantined!
- >Malicious code will run every time an infected app is opened





Infecting an app

- > Rename "good" to something else like "0"
- > Add malicious executable named "good"
- > "good" executable loads "0" to make the app seem normal

^	Date Modified
	May 7, 2012,
	May 7, 2012,
	May 7, 2012,
	Today, 6:50 F
	May 7, 2012,
	May 7, 2012,
	Jan 8, 2013, 4
	~

e e e 😇 good		
Name	^	Date Modified
 Contents 		May 7, 2012,
_CodeSignature		May 7, 2012,
info.plist		May 7, 2012,
MacOS		Today, 6:50 F
iii 0		May 7, 2012,
🔳 good 💶		May 7, 2012,
PkgInfo		May 7, 2012,
Resources		Jan 8, 2013,

Infecting an app


User double-clicks "good" app 📟




System opens "good" executable file 🦨 (which is actually malicious)

"good" executable opens original, renamed executable, to avoid suspicion

good



Infecting an app





You have dysentery.



> Not very!

- > 22 lines of Swift code malicious executable
- >18 lines of AppleScript dropper part 1
- >16 lines of shell script dropper part 2




Exceptions



> Apple's apps can't be modified

- > If you try it, they crash
- > Malicious code still runs!



Exceptions



- >Some third-party apps have self-protection
- > If you change them, they'll let the user know
- > Malicious code still runs!



Something has modified Pacifist's application bundle. The application could be damaged, or could be infected by a virus. Please download an unaltered copy of Pacifist.



Potential giveaways

- > Doubled Dock icons
- > Malicious process shows as bouncing icon
- > Original process appears normally
- > Can be prevented



Potential giveaways

- > Two processes in Activity Monitor
- > Two processes in ps output
- > Could make this less suspicious fairly easily

● ● ●	
<pre>Hyperion:~ thomas\$ ps -axo command grep /Applications/good.app/Contents/MacOS/good</pre>	
<pre>/Applications/good.app/Contents/MacOS/0 grep good.app Hyperion:~ thomas\$</pre>	

Demo time...

How to detect

>Use spctl to verify signature

Good signature:


https://www.endocomestations/source=Developer ID
Hyperion:~ thomas\$

Bad signature:

http://www.endities.com/initiality.com/initial


How to detect

> Use osquery to check signature




How to detect

> Use osquery to check signature




Problem...

>What if the dropper re-signs the app with a different certificate?



Naughty or nice?

- > Possible solution: Santa <u>https://github.com/google/santa</u>
- >Use in lockdown mode to allow only whitelisted apps to run
- > Modified apps will be blocked



Naughty or nice?

Santa

The following application has been blocked from executing because its trustworthiness cannot be determined.

Application	good
Filename	good
Path	/Applications/good.app/Contents/MacOS/good
Publisher	Not code-signed
Identifier	41bf94e3896dacc15fc00f09b2a3eafe fcc28bfe43c3e58f73480a8b5ddf2f65
Parent	launchd (1)
User	test

Prevent future notifications for this application for a day

Ignore

Naughty or nice?

- > Pros:
 - > Difficult to bypass




- > Cons:
 - >Whitelisting will keep you jumping with user requests!
 - >Unrealistic for certain users (eg, developers)



We're all set, then?

- > Not so fast...
- > Some legit apps have no or broken signatures
- > Some apps even break their own signatures!





\$ codesign --display --verbose /Applications/ OpenVPN/OpenVPN\ Connect.app

/Applications/OpenVPN/OpenVPN Connect.app: code object is not signed at all



Obsolete

\$ codesign --verify --verbose ∕Applications⁄ Google∖ Chrome.app

/Applications/Google Chrome.app: resource
envelope is obsolete (custom omit rules)



Broken

\$ codesign --display --verbose ∠Applications∠ YubiKey∖ PIV∖ Manager.app

Executable=/Applications/YubiKey PIV Manager.app/ Contents/MacOS/pivma Identifier=YubiKey PIV Manager

TeamIdentifier=LQA3CS5MM7

\$ codesign --verify --verbose /Applications/ YubiKeyN PIVN Manager.app

/Applications/YubiKey PIV Manager.app: code object
is not signed at all
In subcomponent: /Applications/YubiKey PIV
Manager.app/Contents/MacOS/pivman.pkg



Broken

\$ codesign --verify --verbose ∕Applications⁄ zoom.us.app

/Applications/zoom.us.app: a sealed resource is missing or invalid file added: /Applications/zoom.us.app/Contents/ Frameworks/zMacResRetina.bundle file missing: /Applications/zoom.us.app/Contents/ Plugins/ZoomAudioDevice.kext/Contents/Info.plist file missing: /Applications/zoom.us.app/Contents/ Plugins/ZoomAudioDevice.kext/Contents/Resources/ en.lproj/InfoPlist.strings file missing: /Applications/zoom.us.app/Contents/ Plugins/ZoomAudioDevice.kext/Contents/MacOS/ ZoomAudioDevice


What to do?

- > Look at the signature for every app you use
- > If broken/missing/etc, report it to the vendor
- > If you are a developer, get it right!
- > Spread the word

Thanks !



https://preview.tinyurl.com/ydgf32mk



Bonus points